

RESPONSE TO TOMMIE LAMPRECHT AND OTHERS

28 June 2007

Dear Tommie,

As you have chosen to make this issue public, I will copy my response to your comments on my dissertation *The Cassinga Raid*, together with my response to the resultant, less measured outbursts of others directly to the editor of the *Nuusbrief vir Militêre Veterane*. Hopefully, it will receive the same level of distribution as did your initial letter.

As I told you when I first received your comments, I have been in the midst of moving back to PE after my retirement from the Regular Army. In fact, I am still surrounded by unpacked boxes, but feel that the comments by some people in the *Nuusbrief* require a reaction on my part, as to leave what they have said unchallenged could grace their words with unmerited credibility.

I will forward a copy of the Debriefing Reports for D Company to you once I have completed my unpacking and have located all the relevant documents. I would be pleased to obtain a copy of your original Orders for the raid whenever it is convenient for you to send it to me.

But first, let me deal with your comments. I have already thanked you for your openness in sharing your views with me and have told you that I welcome such comment. I don't expect everyone to concur with my views and I am happy to engage in debate. However, I do take exception to personal attacks and I will not take them lying down.

Command and Control

Thank you for your comments in this regard. I stated categorically in my dissertation that Jan Breytenbach was the battalion commander. There is no controversy about this, despite Gen du Plessis's insistence to the contrary. Where disagreements exist is concerning the brigade HQ and the role of the then Brigadier du Plessis. I spelled out the claims of the various people as well as what I was able to trace from available documentation. However, the matter was never clearly documented and will therefore always be open to conjecture. This is therefore how I had to leave it in the dissertation.

Discipline and Fitness

Regarding the breakdown of discipline and the unfitness of the troops during the final extraction (the one where you were not present), you neglected to mention

that the description I gave was based on interviews with people who, unlike yourself, were there. One of these was a helicopter pilot into whose aircraft the paratroopers were scrambling, several others were officers amongst the paratroopers, one an NCO and then there was General Viljoen himself.

In fact, it was Viljoen who pointed out that the fitness of the troops was not up to standard - both during a debriefing conference after the raid and in an interview that I had with him on his farm in 2002. Regarding discipline, Lew Gerber himself, in the document he wrote after the raid, described the extraction as "every man for himself."

In the dissertation I pointed out that there were varying levels of fitness amongst the paratroopers. You and I, Tommie, served as young Citizen Force lieutenants together in 2 Parachute Battalion back in the early seventies. We both know that when we attended camps there were some guys who had maintained a good level of fitness, but there were others who reported absolutely unfit for the job of a paratrooper. Come on, Tommie, let's not kid ourselves! Because you regularly ran the Comrades does not mean that every CF paratrooper did so.

You comment that "it is easy for people who have not personally experienced the absolute exhaustive nature of a fire fight to make such a wide sweeping statement." I take it you are referring to me, as the author of the dissertation, as having made a sweeping statement. If so, I take extreme exception to what you imply. You have not the vaguest idea what course my military career followed after I joined the Permanent Force, and you have no right to pass such a snide remark.

I served in the paratroops through most of the war years and I participated in many operations and came under fire many times. I commanded both Citizen Force and National Servicemen paratroopers in operations. I have led men in an airborne assault and I have lost men in action. I know what it is to have a man shot next to me while assaulting an enemy position. That horror is not your exclusive experience. I have undergone the physical drain that a fire fight causes and I have felt the cold fear and the angry heat of battle. I don't need you or anyone else to question my combat experience. Over a period of many years I spent numerous periods of up to six months at a time away from home and I participated in operations where I was campaigning inside Angola for long weeks of constant tension broken only by contact with the enemy. It may be difficult to accept, but you and the others who were at Cassinga are not the only paratroopers who fought against SWAPO.

But let me leave your apparent personal attack aside for the moment and get onto what you consider to be the biggest problem that you have with my dissertation, namely whether Cassinga was a legitimate military target and the alleged massacre of civilians.

A Legitimate Military Target or Not?

You go to some lengths to give your deductions that lead you to the conclusion that Cassinga was in fact a legitimate military target. Yet nowhere in my dissertation do I say anything to the contrary. However, I did not write the dissertation as an apologist for the SADF or the paratroopers - it was intended as a dispassionate analysis of an airborne operation, if anyone can indeed be dispassionate.

You need to understand that an academic study is based on a carefully formulated hypothesis. This hypothesis provides the researcher with an aim and with the scope, or parameters within which he will conduct his research. The aim of my dissertation was to prove or disprove the hypothesis. Any professional soldier will confirm the importance of carefully selecting the aim and then of maintaining it. Those who understand the writing of a military staff paper will know that one formulates the aim of the paper before using that to determine the scope of the discussion. I clearly set out my hypothesis in my introductory chapter and I repeated it in my conclusion. For your benefit, I give it again:

“A parachute raid on Cassinga was the only way that the SADF could strike that objective without encountering major resistance en route, the objective itself was a strategically weak point in SWAPO’s defences, the raid was totally unexpected by SWAPO and its allies, and the subsequent extraction of the paratroopers from the objective area was so rapidly executed that SWAPO and its allies were unable to react effectively to the raid.”

My dissertation revolved around this hypothesis. My conclusion, at the end of the dissertation, is that a parachute assault was indeed the only way that Cassinga could be attacked; that Cassinga was in fact a strategically weak point in SWAPO’s defences (though not of sufficient strategic value to disrupt insurgent activity for more than a few months); that an airborne raid on Cassinga was unexpected by SWAPO and its allies (though they had an idea that there could be some sort of raid, for which they expected to receive ample forewarning); but that the final extraction (for reasons which I clearly set out) was not executed rapidly enough to avoid a Cuban counter-attack and the success of the raid was negated by SWAPO winning the subsequent propaganda war. That was what I intended to establish in my dissertation, and that is what I did.

I was at pains to explain that I was not going to try to prove or disprove the claims of the opposing sides regarding the contentious issue of whether Cassinga was a refugee camp or a military base, but that I would concentrate on the purely military aspects of the SADF side of the operation. I stated in my introductory chapter that *“...it is not the purpose of this dissertation to resolve it, nor to endorse one or the other contention.”* It is this approach which determined the hypothesis that I formulated. Nevertheless, my deductions set out at the end of Chapter 3 (“The Nature and Defensibility of Cassinga”) make it abundantly clear that the

objective was a military base. Nowhere do I say that Cassinga was not a legitimate military target and I object to you creating the impression that I did.

Those of us from the old SADF who made a study of revolutionary warfare and read the works of Mao Zedong as well as the classics on counter-insurgency by Sir Robert Thompson and John J. McCuen, and less well-known works by the likes of Colin Mitchell, will understand the composition of an insurgent base. I set this out in summary in the deductions at the end of Chapter 3 of my dissertation. From this it is perfectly obvious that women and even children and old people are likely to be found in significant numbers in an insurgent base. But whether or not that disqualifies it from being considered a legitimate military target is open to debate. Perhaps those who planned the bombing of Dresden and other German cities in the Second World War, fully aware that they would be killing civilians, could provide us with an answer.

I did state quite clearly in Chapter 3 of the dissertation that “*Cassinga, although it might not have been an exclusively military base, most certainly housed SWAPO guerrillas and played some significant command and control role in the PLAN structure.*” Furthermore, I go on to state in my deductions that “*as a military objective, Cassinga was well suited to an airborne attack, based on the information available to the SADF.*” In my final conclusion at the end of the dissertation, I state “*the balance of evidence indicates that, although there were many civilians at Cassinga, it also housed, at the very least, SWAPO’s military headquarters for southern Angola.*” Do I need to be more explicit?

Clearly, from what emerged in my research any reader could make his or her own deductions and come to certain conclusions of their own. This is exactly what you did. But those conclusions are outside the gambit of my hypothesis, so I did not make them. If you and others are going to castigate me for what I did NOT say, that is your problem, not mine. I can only take responsibility for what I did say. If you disapprove of my hypothesis, then you are perfectly at liberty to make your own and to prove or disprove it. I cannot apologise for not selecting the hypothesis that you would like to have seen.

The Alleged Massacre of Civilians

Nowhere in my dissertation do I claim that the paratroopers massacred civilians. For you to state this is disingenuous and misleading. Your quote from my dissertation in this regard is out of context and unacceptable. You fail to point out that it was a reference to the effects of the bombing by the Air Force, which most certainly did cause mass, indiscriminate death (as any bombing attack in any war does). You also fail to observe that I pointed out in the next sentence that “documentary evidence indicates that the SADF grossly underestimated the number of civilians at Cassinga, and that the intention had never been to kill civilians, specifically not women and children.”

You also chose not to mention that I had stated “during the fighting both civilians and guerrillas sheltered in the same trenches, making civilian casualties inevitable.”

Had you taken the trouble, you would have noticed that just a few lines further on in the dissertation I used the term “massacre of refugees” in inverted commas, thereby clearly casting doubt on the veracity of the term.

Why did I not condemn SWAPO for housing civilians in a military camp? Come, now, Tommie, I think I’ve explained that one! It was not my intention to criticise SWAPO’s actions - my hypothesis makes it clear that I am focussing on the military aspects of the SADF action. You want me to condemn SWAPO, but you have missed the purpose of the dissertation. By not commenting on the morality of their employment of the tenets of revolutionary warfare as set out by Mao Zedong, hardly means that I condone what they did. Would I have spent 15 years of my life actively and literally fighting Communism at considerable sacrifice to my family if I condoned their actions?

Your argument about wanting to criticize or condemn SWAPO for housing civilians in a military base is in any case a tenuous one. Do you want to also condemn the SADF for housing civilians in Oshakati, right next to the main operational HQ for all SADF activities in Owamboland and a large part of Southern Angola? Or are you going to try to convince me that the wives and children of Permanent Force soldiers stationed there were in no danger of being subjected to stand-off bombardments, land-mines, ambushes and other techniques employed by SWAPO in the way that they waged the war?

It is most unfortunate that you have chosen to accuse me of “putting a knife into the Citizen Force soldiers.” Your diatribe about the English and Afrikaans speaking paratroopers and their political affiliations is a little hard to follow, particularly as I am personally acquainted with most of them. I served proudly as a CF paratrooper for eight years before joining the PF, and now that I have reached compulsory retirement age from the Regular Force I have again joined the Reserves. I have no axe to grind with the citizen soldiers. If I did have, I wouldn’t be one.

The only reason that none of the CF soldiers ever spoke out about what happened at Cassinga was because there was no deliberate massacre. (I won’t even go into the despicable implication in your letter that PF officers would have countenanced such a thing, but the CF would not have!)

Nobody (not even you) denies that civilians were killed at Cassinga. I have not apportioned blame for those deaths to the paratroopers, nor to SWAPO. Civilians die in war. That is a fact of life. I made it clear that the SADF never intended killing civilians. I am happy with that. If you are not, once again, that is your problem, not mine.

You are apparently convinced that I have my knife in for the Citizen Force paratroopers who were at Cassinga. Yet other than to state that a regular battalion of paratroopers with an established and practised HQ and soldiers that knew one another well and were on the same level of fitness would have been better suited for the job, I fail to see where I have been harsh on the part-time soldiers. And I stand by what I have said. It makes basic military common sense. The fact is (as I explained in Chapter 6) that there was not such a battalion available at the time, so a composite battalion of mostly CF paratroopers was used. And in the deductions to Chapter 6 I clearly state that “the composite parachute battalion was well-trained in the available time.”

If you feel that I left SWAPO “smelling like roses” simply because I did not analyse their part in the battle, then I can again only say that you have missed the point. You have approached my dissertation with your own preconceived idea of what you feel I should have commented on, and you have failed to carefully consider what my intention was. You expected me to portray SWAPO in a negative light, and because I did not conform to your expectations you have decided that I have failed all paratroopers.

I analysed a military operation. I did so as a professional military man and a scholar who has devoted his life to the study of airborne operations. I had and have no interest in analysing SWAPO’s actions. You’ll have to look elsewhere to find someone to do that for you. Perhaps someone with an Intelligence background.

In what sense do I then “deliver a most devastating blow to the integrity of the South African paratroopers?” Surely this is your own perception, based on a misrepresentation of what I have written? Here are some of my comments on the operation:

- *“The short duration of the raid, the rapidity of the extraction and the airborne nature of that extraction, all being done without employing an airfield, made the operation exceptional, and also highly risky.”*
- *“The operation was, according to what it set out to do, a resounding success and what could very easily have gone wrong did not. From a military point of view it was a daring, high-risk venture in the classic mould of an innovative airborne surprise attack. Casualties amongst the paratroopers were light and the only major failure in terms of the objectives set was the inability to bring back prisoners.”*
- *“The reasons for the success can be ascribed to initiative and innovation on the part of certain of the paratroopers and maintenance of the aim by the commander as well as the vital role of the Air Force.”*

I would hardly call this a devastating blow to the integrity of the paratroopers. On the contrary, I would say that it reflects extremely favourably on their actions. It hardly portrays them as “incompetent” (the word you used to describe the

impression you accused me of creating). You see, Tommie, it all depends on where you lay the emphasis in what you read!

Of course, I had much criticism for some aspects of the raid. I feel these were justified criticisms from a military point of view, but they remain my opinions. Other professional soldiers may have a very different view, and that is their professional right, as long as it is based on sound, accepted military principles. I set out to do a critique of the operation. You may have wanted me to be more complimentary, but that is not how one analyses a military operation.

If you feel I have “failed the paratroopers” then perhaps you can explain to me where all the dedicated paratroopers were when the airborne organisation collapsed during the post 1994 era? Where was their expertise and experience when it was desperately needed? Why is it that our two Reserve Force parachute battalions can barely muster one platoon between them today? What happened to the dedicated part-time paratroopers? And where is the expertise that lay with all those experienced Permanent Force paratroopers? They left, took their expertise elsewhere and we only ever heard of them again through the grapevine.

Only a small handful of us faced the problem and battled to resurrect that capability in the face of tremendous adversity. And only now is a semblance of the old capability beginning to emerge as a result of these efforts. Where were those who are so quick to criticise now? Most had long ago baled out and left the organisation and the paratroopers to sink. So who actually failed the paratroopers?

I get the impression that you see “the paratroopers” as only those people who served with you. I’m afraid that I take a far broader view. Whilst I harbour deep feelings of affection for the people I served with in the paratroops 25 years ago, I also have feelings for those I’ve worked with in the paratroops over the past 15 years. But in my dissertation I’m concerned with a concept within the art of war, not merely a small group of people. By ensuring that the concept is correct and that shortcomings in the paratroopers of yesterday are addressed, I can contribute to better possibilities for the paratroopers of today and tomorrow. This I do by still attending airborne exercises and training, jumping with the paratroopers, researching airborne matters and revising the airborne doctrine of the SANDF.

On the whole I found your comments unfortunate and very selective. You took many of the quotes you refer to out of context and you failed to balance them with other references I made. By having your comments published in the *Nuusbrief* you have reached a wide audience for your claims. Some of those who read them will, as is already evident, accept them at face value. I would like to believe that the majority will first read the dissertation themselves and come to their own conclusions.

I understand your burning desire to see only what you want to see, particularly given your involvement in the operation and the actions you took to clear the trench leading to the AA gun. What you did can only be described as heroic. Many people who were there feel bitter that you were never awarded a medal for your actions. By all accounts they are right and nobody would have been happier than me to see you get that acknowledgement. But your personal involvement does make you subjective. One of the reasons I selected the Cassinga Raid as the subject for my dissertation is precisely because I was not there.

And in case your closing salutation is meant to imply that I'm not proud to be a paratrooper, let me correct your impression.

Still proud to be an active paratrooper!

McGILL ALEXANDER
(BRIGADIER GENERAL, RESERVE FORCE)

Responses to Other Comments in the *Nuusbrief*

Berig 23/2007 dd 03 Jun 07

It is a pity that whoever wrote the comment under the heading "The Airborne Assault at Cassinga" didn't take the trouble to establish his facts first. "The Cassinga Raid" was a History MA dissertation. I did not submit the dissertation to Tukkies, but to Unisa and I did not submit it last year, but in 2003. It was accepted the same year and the degree was awarded *cum laude*. It was evaluated by four examiners: two from Unisa, one from the University of Stellenbosch and one from the University of Cape Town. Three of them were Heads of their universities' Departments of History and one had served in the old SADF.

The force involved was a battalion minus and not a battalion plus. I never anywhere claimed that the battalion was guilty of the indiscriminate killing of refugees and I never "bandied about" the word "massacre." That is an infamous lie and I reject it outright. Where I used the word I did so with the utmost circumspection. If you don't have the inclination, time or ability to read the dissertation, then try to take the trouble to read my response to Tommie Lamprecht who at least read the document before commenting.

Clearly, whoever this anonymous person is who gaily throws out such libellous statements, never took the trouble to first read the dissertation. He is treading on dangerous ground that could lead to litigation if he had the courage to identify himself!

I also question the integrity and credibility of the *Nuusbrief* if it publishes such unsubstantiated trash without first verifying and identifying the source.

Wat Daan Nell se kommentaar aanbetref, kan ek net meld dat ek taamlik teleurgesteld is. Daan, ek ken jou as 'n man van integriteit met 'n gematigde uitkyk op die lewe en wat eers dink voordat hy praat. Ek het nog altyd waarde geheg aan jou opinies. As jy regtig dink dat ek nie eers 'n onderhoud met Jan Breytenbach gevoer het nie, hoe verduidelik jy dat my verhandeling na nie minder nie as vyf verskillende onderhoude met hom verwys? Hy was een van 45 mense met wie ek onderhoude gevoer het oor 'n tydperk van 12 jaar en met baie van hulle het ek meer as een onderhoud gevoer. Maar dit is duidelik dat ook jy nie die verhandeling gelees het nie. Kom, nou Daan, dis nie wat ek van 'n oud KS verwag nie!

Terloops, ek het deur sy seun vir Jan 'n afskrif van my verhandeling laat kry. Jan het my gebel nadat hy die verhandeling gelees het, en alhoewel hy nie met sekere aspekte van my uiteensetting van die bevel en beheer opset saamstem nie, het hy geen ander besware gemaak nie. Die verhandeling is ook deur Lt genl Ian Gleeson, wat oorhoofse bevelvoerder van Operasie Reindeer was, gelees. Hy het vir my deeglike geskrewe terugvoer gegee en nie een van die besware geoffer wat in die *Nuusbrief* verskyn het nie, insluitend dié van Tommie Lamprecht.

Berig 24/2007 dd10 Jun 07

Ek kan maar net Deon Fourie se raad beaam: lees eers die verhandeling.

Fred Kruger, try advising people to read the whole thing and not just selected pages. It may help them to put what they read into context.

Willem Steenkamp, ek sou nooit verwag dat jy met my gevolgtrekkings sou saamstem nie. Ek maak my gevolgtrekkings soos in 'n militêre waardering, uit die oogpunt van 'n professionele soldaat. Jy maak joune uit die oogpunt van 'n journalist wat 'n boek skryf wat moet verkoop om suksesvol te wees. Dit is dus onwaarskynlik dat die twee sou ooreenstem. Dit is egter jou volle reg om te voel dat my gevolgtrekkings ongegrond en onregverdig is, maar dit is ook my volle reg om te voel dat hulle op goeie militêre beginsels gebaseer is. Ek het immers valskermsoldate in die geveg aangevoer en ook my vakgebied oor baie jare beide hier en in verskeie buitelandse weermagte deeglik bestudeer by militêre skole, kolleges, akademies en opleidingsentrums.

Graag wil ek weet met wie jy so oortuig is dat ek witvoetjie speel? Ek skuld niemand iets nie en verwag van niemand iets nie. In al my 27 jare in die ou SAW het ek nooit so laag gedaal dat ek by enigiemand gat gekruip het nie, ten spyte van die feit dat ek nooit 'n broeder was of kon wees nie. In my 13 jaar in die nuwe SANW het ek my ook nooit gewend tot gatkruipery nie, ten spyte van die

feit dat ek nooit 'n bro was of kon wees nie. Wat ek bereik het, het ek self gedoen en ek het deurgaans slegs op hulp van bo en op my eie Godgegewe en hard verdiende vermoens vertrou. Vir jou om aantuigings te maak dat dit nie so is nie, is nie net verregaande, dit is veragtelik. Jy ken my nie eers nie (alhoewel jy oor my geskryf het, sonder om met my 'n onderhoud te voer en met verkeerde feite), maar jy het die vermetelheid om my integriteit te bevraagteken. Ek dink dit is laag, uiteraard laag!

Buiten dit, impliseer jy daardeur dat die universiteit wat die graad aan my toegeken het oop is vir gatkruipery en dat hulle grade gevolglik bevraagteken behoort te wees. Al wat ek kan sê is dat Unisa vir my behandel het net soos jy sê die ou SAW jou behandel het met die skryf van jou boeke.

En waar het ek jou bestempel as een van die instrumente van apartheid? Vir iemand wat sê hy't die verhandeling gelees moes jy dit uiteraard oppervlakkig gedoen het. Ek het wel jou boeke beoordeel as onder dié groep wat "unashamedly biased in favour of the *apartheid* government" was en as "pro-SADF" In vergelyking met baie van die ander sekondêre bronne wat ek gebruik het was hulle wel. In elk geval, dit was my opinie, waarop ek geregtig is. Maar as 'n "instrument van apartheid," nee! Dit het ek nooit gesê nie. Om dit te beweer is dalk goeie joernalistieke taktiek, maar dit is nie waar nie.

Terloops, jou boeke was nooit deur my gebruik as primêre bronne nie. Dalk verstaan jy nie dat 'n boek van daardie aard, wat tweedehandse informasie besit, in die akademie nooit hoër as 'n sekondêre bron kan wees nie. Dit beteken die informasie moet getoets word voordat dit aanvaar word. Jou boeke was deel van die 144 gepubliseerde werke wat ek wel geraadpleeg het, buiten honderde ander sekondêre bronne.

Blikkies Blignaut, ek staan verstom oor jou uitlating. Ek het jou altyd as 'n vriend beskou en was jou nog altyd immers dankbaar dat jy my aanbeveel het om voor 'n officierskeuraad te verskyn. Dit was na afloop van 'n "Escape and Evasion" oefening wat ek en ander Burgermag valskermersoldate meegemaak het toe ek nog 'n korporaal was in 1970. Maar nou verwys jy skertsend na my as "die sogenaamde 'Master Paratrooper'". Ek was, nadat André Bestbier die Weermag verlaat het, aangestel as die "Master Paratrooper" deur die Hoof van Gesamentlike Operasies. My taak was om hom op hoogte te hou van die SANW se gesamentlike lugstormvermoë en hom raad te gee oor lugstormaangeleenthede. Dit het ek gedoen deur die valskerm- en lugmobiele magte te besoek tydens ontplooiings en oefeninge, hulle te evalueer en aanbevelings te maak. Hoekom sou dit nou "sogenaamd" wees? Was André Bestbier ook "sogenaamd"? Of verwys jy ook na wat ander gesê het oor my verhandeling, wat jy erken jy ook nog nie gelees het nie?

Herman du Plessis, jy is vinnig om Tommie se standpunt te steun. Het jy darem, soos hy, eers die verhandeling gelees? Indien wel, dalk het jy dan ook, soos hy, die pot misgesit ten opsigte van die doel van die verhandeling?

Paul Gerber, it is not so very funny to have refugees on a parade. At most refugee camps the people are gathered together in the mornings to allocate tasks to them for the day. Have you ever been to a refugee camp in Darfur? I have. For the record, included in my dissertation are photos (Unfortunately, no photos are displayed on the website copy of the dissertation) of PLAN cadres on parade at Cassinga prior to the raid - irrefutable proof that it was a military installation, even if there were refugees there too. But then, you probably have also not read the dissertation, and would rather make inane, meaningless and unfounded statements.

Berig 25/2007 dd 17 Jun 07

Seker ook maar goed dat julle nie Frans Botes se opmerkings geplaas het nie, want dit wil voorkom dat hulle ook gebaseer is op wat ander gesê het, die meeste waarvan nie eers die verhandeling gelees het nie maar wat baie gretig was om oordeel te vel.

Willem Steenkamp, ek is bly jy beskou die verhandeling as 'n waardevolle bydrae tot die Cassinga-verhaal. Dat jy aanstoot neem oor party van my gevolgtrekkings en woordkeuses is jou volle reg, net soos dit my reg is om, soos jy hierbo sal agterkom, aanstoot te neem oor jou skewe aantuigings.

I was once a DS and later returned for some years as the Chief Instructor at the SA Army College's Command and Staff Duties Branch. Those of you who had the privilege of undergoing senior Staff training will recall that it was the job of a DS to be "brutally frank" about your prowess. When we were on course, we learned to accept and process their criticism and evaluation, even when we didn't always agree with it. The DS criticised constructively with an eye to improving us (or that was the theory behind it, anyway). If I have been brutally frank in my evaluation of the military dimensions of the Cassinga Raid, I make no apology for it.

Ten slotte, miskien moet ek julle met 'n aanhaling uit die laaste bladsy van my verhandeling los:

"There can be no doubt that the final word on Cassinga has not yet been spoken."